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NOTE
MCA, Inc. v. United States: Judicial
Recognition of the Separate Interests
Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
For United States federal tax purposes, the classification of an en-
tity as a partnership or a corporation has significant ramifications, par-
ticularly with respect to entities in foreign countries.' Classification is
especially important to the owners-whether shareholders or part-
ners--of the entity because the question of whether they are taxed on
their share of the profits or only upon repatriation will often depend on
how the entity, set up under foreign law, is recognized by the Internal
Revenue Service (Service). While entity classification in the domestic
area has always been vulnerable to challenge, foreign entities face an
additional problem in view of the Service's application of a rather com-
plicated "separate interests" test.2 While in theory the classification of
a foreign entity embodies the same tests as the classification of a do-
mestic entity,3 recent cases and revenue rulings have created uncer-
tainty and confusion for United States taxpayers wishing to conduct
some portion of their operations abroad. In MCA, Inc. v. United
States,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ex-
1 Entity classification is important for foreign entities when dealing with transfers of property
under I.R.C. §§ 367 and 1491, the timing and recognition of income and losses, the foreign tax
credit, the source and interest of profit distributions, the allocation of income and expenses, and
the calculation of earnings and profits. See New York State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, Report on
Foreign Entity Characterization for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 35 TAX L. REV. 167, 169-87
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Tax Report].
2 See infra notes 51-92 and accompanying text.
3 Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613.
4 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'g MCA, Inc. v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 838 (C.D. Cal.
1980).
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amined this problem of classifying foreign entities for federal tax pur-
poses. In this case of first impression, the court held that United States
film distribution outlets in various foreign countries, which were organ-
ized as partnerships5 by a controlled foreign corporation (CFC)6 and
by its employee trust, were partnerships for federal tax purposes. In so
holding, the court refused to find that the CFC and its trust represented
a "single economic interest,"7 although as a practical matter they were
likely to act in concert in the management of the distributorships.' In
addition, the court held that provisions in the organizational docu-
ments of the distributorships that restricted the transferability of inter-
ests and limited the continuity of life should be given legal effect.9 The
court rejected the unsupported assumption that the trustees of the em-
ployee trust would always act in concert with the corporations, even in
derogation of their fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, while overruling the
district court opinion on the facts, the court recognized the existence of
the separate interests theory,10 the first and only time the theory has
received any judicial support.
This Note will examine both the district court's and the court of
appeals' application of the separate interests theory to the fact situation
presented by the taxpayers in this case. It will also question the validity
of the theory, and whether it can ever be consistently applied. Finally,
it will explore whether the use of this stricter standard exclusively with
respect to foreign entities is justified and what taxpayers who wish to
use the partnership vehicle in conducting operations abroad will have
to do in the future to minimize the risk of reclassification.
II. MCA, INc. v UNrED STATES
A. Facts of the Case
As part of a joint venture agreement with Paramount Pictures Cor-
poration, plaintiffs, MCA and its wholly owned subsidiary Universal
Studios, formed a Dutch corporation, Cinema International Corpora-
5 In setting up these entities, the local attorneys in each country were advised to form the
distribution entities so as to make them independent taxable entities and simultaneously avoid at
least two of the four corporate characteristics (continuity of life, centralization of management,
limited liability, and free transferability of interests) provided for in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2,
T.D. 7889, 1983-21 LR.B. 16, and Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1960).
6 For a definition of "controlled foreign corporation" see infra note 18.
7 See infra notes 50-78 and accompanying text.
8 685 F.2d at 1104.
9 Id.
10 See infra notes 50-91 and accompanying text.
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tion (CIC) to handle the distribution of their films abroad.' MCA and
Paramount each received forty-nine percent of the corporation's
stock. 2 "Stichting," an employee trust set up by MCA and Paramount
for the benefit of CIC's board of directors owned the remaining two
percent. 13 Stichting operated under a three-member board of trustees,
with two trustees appointed by the CIC board of directors, who in turn
appointed the third.' 4
Shortly after Stichting was created, CIC and Stichting, through
Stichting's wholly owned subsidiary Proteus, jointly established local
distributorship outlets to distribute films in their respective geographic
territories.'5 In order to obtain favorable tax treatment under the Sub-
part F provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), 6 the organiza-
tional documents of each distributorship were designed so as to avoid
inclusion of the corporate characteristics of continuity of life and free
transferability of interests, thereby meeting the partnership require-
ments of Treasury Regulation 301.7701-2.17
Because it was undisputed that CIC was a "controlled foreign cor-
poration" within the meaning of section 957(a) of the Code,i" all Sub-
11 685 F.2d at 1100.
12 Id.
13 For the years in question, 1972 and 1973, the Board of Directors of CIC consisted of the
chief executive officer of MCA and the chief executive officer of Paramount, both being granted
the authority to choose three additional directors. Id.
14 For the years 1972 and 1973 the CIC Board of Directors appointed to the Board of Trustees
the two chief executive officers of MCA and Paramount, who in turn appointed a Dutch attorney
to act as the third trustee. Id. at 1101.
Is The 5 percent ownership interest in each local distributorship was owned by the em-
ployee trust through Proteus, B.V., a Netherlands corporation wholly owned by the employee
trust, rather than directly, since in many foreign countries, the concept of a trust as a foreign
owner is unknown, whereas a Netherlands B.V. is a generally recognized form of business
organization which is commonly accepted as a foreign owner.
Brief for Appellants at 4, MCA, Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as MCA Brief].
"Operation through CIC branch offices.. .was not a feasible alternative because of the com-
mercial need to establish a permanent and separate presence in each country," 502 F. Supp. at
840, and because of local foreign law in many of the countries which preventedforeign corpora-
tions from engaging in film distribution. Id. Local distribution outlets were established in Argen-
tina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Columbia, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong,
Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, South Africa, Trinidad, United
Kingdom and Venezuela. Id. at 842-43.
16 I.R.C. §§ 951-72 (1976).
17 The government conceded that each of the distributorships was organized for substantial
business reasons unrelated to U.S. taxes. MCA chose to organize the distributorships as partner-
ships (rather than corporations) under the tests of the Income Tax Regulations so as to defer
recognition of income and thereby minimize its tax liability. MCA clearly had a legal right to do
this. See MCA Brief, supra note 15, at 11 (citing Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir.
1934), afl'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).
18 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1976) provides:
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part F income1 9 earned by CIC was to be included in the taxable
income of CIC's United States shareholders, MCA and Paramount, in
the year the income was earned.2" Among the items included in Sub-
part F income is "foreign base company income,"'" which includes all
rents and royalties received from "related persons." 2 An entity is a
related person with respect to a CFC "if. . .(B) such person is a corpo-
ration which.. .is controlled by. . .the controlled foreign corporation;
or (C)... is a corporation which is controlled by the same person or
persons which control the controlled foreign corporation."23 Because
the statute excludes "controlled partnerships" from its definition of re-
lated persons, partnership classification of the film distributorship out-
lets was critical. In this regard, the parties agreed that if the
distributorships were indeed partnerships, MCA would prevail in the
case because as a shareholder of CIC, MCA is subject to tax on its
share of non-Subpart F income only when it actually receives it in the
form of dividends.24
B. The District Court's Opinion
In determining whether the entities were partnerships or corpora-
tions, the district court applied the test set out in Larson v. Commis-
sioner.'- Referred to as the "preponderance test," this objective test
provides that a business organization that has associates, 26 and an ob-
jective to carry on a business and divide the gains therefrom, is to be
treated as a "corporation" for United States income tax purposes if the
organization has at least three of the four characteristics of "corporate-
For purposes of this subpart, the term 'controlled foreign corporation' means any foreign
corporation of which more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote is owned (within the meaning of section 958(a)), or is considered as
owned by applying the rules of ownership of section 958(b), by United States shareholders on
any day during the taxable year of such foreign corporation.
19 For a definition of what constitutes Subpart F income see infra notes 110, 114-16 and ac-
companying text.
20 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (1976).
21 I.R.C. § 952(a)(2).
22 I.R.C. § 954(a)(1), (c)(3)(A).
23 I.R.C. § 954(d)(3) (emphasis added). "Control" is defined as "the ownership, directly or
indirectly, of stock possessing more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote." Id.
24 685 F.2d at 1101.
25 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B.L
26 "Associates" has generally been held to mean a number of persons uniting together for
some special purpose or business. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356 (1935).
Neither § 7701 nor its regulations define the term "associates," other than to say that having asso-
ciates is an essential characteristic for an organization to be classified as an association. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2).
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ness": (1) continuity of life, (2) centralization of management, (3) lim-
ited liability, and (4) free transferability of interests.2 7
While the court conceded that if a literal interpretation of
corporateness were used, none of the outlets would have the requisite
three features of corporateness, it accepted the government's argument
that these local distribution outlets were "in fact structured and oper-
ated in a manner which so closely parallels that of a corporation as to
defeat their nominal characterization as 'partnerships.' "28 The govern-
ment maintained that because MCA and its joint venturer, Paramount,
were in actual control of both CIC, which had a ninety-five percent
interest in each outlet, and the Stichting-CIC Employees Trust, which
had a five percent interest in each outlet, CIC and the trust did not
constitute separate and independent interests in the local distribution
outlet. 29 The government pointed out that two of the people who con-
trolled CIC, the chief executive officers of MCA and Paramount, were
also two of the three trustees of Stichting. From this fact, it argued that
"it would be difficult to foresee any circumstance in which [they, as
trustees of Stichting] would find it necessary to act in derogation of the
interest of CIC. . .with regard to the local outlets.' 30 The government
and the court discounted the strict fiduciary duties that both Nether-
lands and California law impose on the trustees, concluding that the
enormous discretion accorded the trustees by the trust agreement em-
powered them to operate the trust in a manner consistent with the aims
of CIC.3 1
The government's claim that the partnership interests were not
separate, but identical, would under the separate interests theory cause
the corporate characteristics of continuity of life and free transferability
of interests to be present. This is so because if either partner, CIC or
Stichting, had wished to sell its interest in a local outlet, the other
would not have blocked the sale. Moreover, the characteristic of con-
tinuity of life will be found to exist if the separate interests theory is
applied. This characteristic exists, of course, where "the death, in-
sanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion of any member
will not cause a dissolution of the organization." 32 If there existed no
separate interests which would demand termination upon the occur-
rence of one of these events, the government contended, a local outlet
27 66 T.C. at 172.
28 502 F. Supp. at 843.
29 Id. at 844.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 844-45.
32 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
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could survive such an occurrence just as a corporation would.33
Because many of the outlets also possessed the corporate charac-
teristic of limited liability, in addition to the two other characteristics
provided by the separate interests theory, the court found the outlets to
be associations taxable as corporations.34 The income from these out-
lets constituted more than seventy percent of CIC's earnings. Conse-
quently, under section 954(b)(3)(B), all of CIC's income was treated as
foreign base company income.35 In sum, CIC's entire income, includ-
ing income received from those outlets that were not found to be taxa-
ble as corporations, was treated as Subpart F income and taxed as such
to the CIC shareholders.
Commentators immediately condemned the district court opinion
and its use of the separate interests test, primarily because the court
failed to recognize that separate interests did indeed exist with respect
to the distributorship outlets,36 and because the court's application of
Revenue Ruling 77-214 to the MCA facts was erroneous.37 Moreover,
some commentators expressed concern that the Service might try to ap-
ply the separate interests test to domestic entities38 and that if the ruling
in MCA was not modified or reversed, the only way to avoid future
reclassification of entities as corporations would be to ensure that an
unrelated party owned a significant percentage of the distribution
entity.39
C. The Court of Appeals' Opinion
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately
33 502 F. Supp. at 846.
34 Id. at 847.
35 Known as the "10-70" rule, I.R.C. § 954(b)(3) (1976) provides that if less than 10% of the
CFC's gross income is Subpart F income, that amount will be treated as de minimis and will be
totally disregarded. But if more than 70% of the CFC's gross income is Subpart F income, the
entire gross income for that year will be treated as if it were Subpart F income.
36 See Majers, Entity Classftcatior" The Separate Interests Test, 8 INT'L TAx J. 263, 268-69
(1982). In addition to arguing that the fiduciary obligations of the trustees of the employee trust
automatically gave rise to separate interests, the author criticizes the court for ignoring the pres-
ence of two additional, separate and distinct, 49% shareholders at the second level: MCA and
Paramount. Id.
37 Id See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
38 See Majers, supra note 36, at 271. See also Hamilton, MC, Inc.-Classftcation OfForeign
Entities As Associations or Partnerships, 59 TAXEs 303, 306-07 (1981). As Hamilton points out,
however, the Service decided not to apply the separate interests test to domestic entities in Rev.
Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448. A similar attempt to incorporate it into proposed regulations on
January 5, 1977, also failed. Id. at 306-07.
39 Hamilton, supra note 38, at 307-08.
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reversed and ruled in favor of the taxpayer,40 it did so without overrul-
ing the separate interests test established by the Service in Revenue
Ruling 77-214. 41 In analyzing the facts of the MCA1 case, the court
immediately distinguished them from the facts of Revenue Ruling 77-
21442 by recognizing that CIC and Stichting, the two partners owning
the distributorship entities, were beneficially owned by parties with
separate and distinct economic interests-CIC principally by MCA
and Paramount, and Stichting by the individual employees of CIC.4 3
Thus, there existed a potential for legitimate conflict of interest be-
tween them in the management of the distributorships.44
As to the government's theory that because CIC and Stichting
were subject to the common control of MCA and Paramount, there was
no potential for legitimate conflict of interest in the management of the
distributorships, the court claimed that this argument disregarded the
trustees' duty of loyalty to the Stichting beneficiaries.45 While the trust
instrument accorded the trustees broad discretion in the management
of the trust, they had a duty under California law, to exercise their
powers in good faith and without concern for their own personal inter-
ests or those of third parties. The court rejected the assumption im-
plied in the government's theory that in the event of conflicting
interests, the trustees would always choose the corporate interests of
MCA and Paramount over the interests of the individual CIC employ-
ees who were the trust beneficiaries, thereby disregarding their fiduci-
40 685 F.2d at 1100.
41 1977-1 C.B. 408. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
42 In that ruling, two domestic corporations had formed an unincorporated entity under Ger-
man law and were each a wholly owned subsidiary of the same domestic parent. Rev. Rul. 77-
214, 1977-1 C.B. 413.
43 685 F.2d at 1103.
44 It is not material that conflict between the separate interests might occur only in occasional
circumstances, because that is the typical situation between partners who have a basis for commit-
ment to a joint business enterprise. It is only material that the opportunity for conflict exists. See
MCA Brief, supra note 15, at 28.
45 685 F.2d at 1103.
46 California law, rather than Netherlands law, was applied because the parties failed to give
written notice of intent to raise an issue of foreign law as required by Rule 44.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In such a case, the court looks to the law of the forum state, here
California, to determine the nature of the trustees' fiduciary duty. 685 F.2d at 1103. In any event,
the trustees' duties and obligations under Netherlands law are similar. See MCA Brief, supra note
15, at 35-37 (opinion by Dutch counsel that in the event of a conflict between their duties as
directors of CIC and their duties as trustees of the employee trust, the two chief executive officers
would have had a duty under Netherlands law to take action to eliminate the conflict, or, if that
were not possible, to resign as trustees in order to be replaced by others who had no such conflict
of interest).
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ary duty as trustees.47 As the court pointed out, a similar theory had
been rejected in the area of family partnerships.48
Finally, the court rejected the government's argument that the reg-
ulations under section 7701 should be construed broadly to classify the
distributorships as corporations and eliminate what the government ar-
gued was an abusive type of tax shelter. Because Congress wrote the
statute unambiguously to apply to Subpart F income received from
controlled corporations and not from controlled partnerships, the court
refused to depart from the plain language of the statute. The court
concluded that "[i]f the omission of income received from controlled
partnerships has indeed created an unjustified loophole in the tax laws,
the remedy lies in new legislation, not in judicial improvisation."49
Having distinguished the facts of this case from those of Revenue Rul-
ing 77-214, the Ninth Circuit thus left in doubt the validity of the sepa-
rate interests test.
III. ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND THE SEPARATE INTERESTS TEST
A. Definition of a Corporation for Tax Purposes
Despite its rather extensive regulations in other areas, Subpart F
does not provide its own definition of a corporation. Therefore, the
court in MCA referred to the tests prescribed by Treasury Regulation
301.7701-2. These tests grew out of the landmark decision in Morrissey
v. Commissioner,50 where the United States Supreme Court held that
whether an unincorporated organization was to be taxed as a corpora-
tion would depend on the presence of six principal characteristics:
(1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on a business and divide the
gains therefrom, (3) centralization of management, (4) limited liability,
(5) continuity of life, and (6) free transferability of interests.51 In 1960,
the Service incorporated these characteristics into its regulations deal-
ing with the classification of entities, intending at that time to make it
difficult to be classified as a corporation for tax purposes. 52 The Service
47 685 F.2d at 1104.
48 Id See Bateman v. United States, 490 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973) (ruling that where the
trustees were obligated to exercise their broad powers in accordance with fiduciary principles,
absent evidence that the trustees had abused their fiduciary duties, the trusts must receive tax
recognition).
49 685 F.2d at 1105.
50 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
51 Id. at 359.
52 The regulations were issued in response to United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1954), where the court, relying on Morrissey, found an unincorporated association of Montana
doctors to be taxable as a corporation. See Tax Report, supra note 1, at 189. These regulations
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required that "an unincorporated organization shall not be classified as
an association unless such organization has more corporate characteris-
tics than noncorporate characteristics. ' 3
Because two of the characteristics-the presence of associates and
the objective to carry on a business and divide the gains therefrom-
are common to both corporations and partnerships, the regulations
provide that they are to be disregraded and that an organization must
possess three out of the four remaining corporate characteristics to be
considered a corporation.54 While the Code provides the standards,
however, local law is applied to determine whether the legal relation-
ships that have been established in the formation of the organization
are such that the definitional standards have been met.5"
An organization has centralized management if any person, or any
group of persons not including all the members, has continuing exclu-
sive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the
organization.56 Centralized management does not exist if all members
have the power to bind the entity, even though they have agreed con-
tractually not to exercise that power, such as in a partnership with a
management committee. In MCA, the parties stipulated that central-
ized management did not exist.57 The government, however, claimed
that MCA's failure to argue the absence of this characteristic in its brief
confirmed the presence of both free transferability and continuity of
life.58
have been accused of being pro-partnership. See, e.g., Fisher, Classiftcation Under Section 7701-
The Past, Present, and Prospects For the Future, 30 TAX LAW. 627, 630 (1977) (concluding that
each of the corporate characteristics was drafted in such a fashion that more likely than not the
corporate characteristic will be found not to exist).
53 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960). The Code defines a partnership as follows: "The
term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organi-
zation, through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on,
and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation. ... I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(2) (1976).
54 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3). While the regulations also make reference to "other fac-
tors" that may be significant in classifying an enterprise, id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), the Service has
made it clear that these factors will not be considered independent of their bearing on the major
corporate characteristics. Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448. Thus, "it would appear that the test
is certain and mechanical, focusing on the four major traits in the partnership context." P.
POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION § 10.02 n.5 (1982).
55 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
56 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (1960).
57 685 F.2d at 1102.
58 Brief for Appellee at 23, MCA, Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) [herein-
after cited as Government Brief]:
Here, CIC has 95% control of the outlets, and MCA and Paramount, via control of CIC,
Stichting, and Proteus, have total defacto control of the outlets. This very concentration of
power acts to thwart a finding of (representative) centralized management, because CIC and
MCA, Inc. v. United States
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The characteristic of limited liability is present if, under local law,
there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of, or the
claims against, the organization.5 9 Personal liability results when a
creditor may obtain personal satisfaction from a member of the organi-
zation to the extent that the assets of the organization are insufficient to
satisfy the creditor's claim .6  The parties in MCA stipulated that under
local law and under the organizational documents of most of the dis-
tributorships limited liability did exist.61
The regulations provide that continuity of life exists if the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion of any mem-
ber will not cause a dissolution of the organization. 2 An agreement
providing that upon the death or withdrawal of any member, the busi-
ness will be continued by the remaining members, will not establish
continuity of life if under local law the death or withdrawal causes a
dissolution of the organization.6 3  The parties in MCA agreed that
Proteus are synonymous. MCA has obviously opted not to advance its most convincing argu-
ment on the absence of this characteristic [under the rationale of Zuckman v. United States],
because to do so would call attention to the real character of CIC and Proteus.
Id. at 24.
In its reply, MCA concurred with the government's reading of Zuckman that when there are
few partners with substantial control, representative or centralized management is effectively ruled
out, but maintained that MCA did not have de facto control but merely a 95% interest. Reply
Brief for Appellant at 9, MCA, Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982).
59 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960). While some argue that limited liability should pre-
clude partnership status, the Service has ruled that an enterprise possessing this trait may be a
partnership. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7737049 (June 17, 1977); see also infra note 60.
60 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960). See Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg.
75,709-10 (1980), providing that if all members of an entity had limited liability under local law,
the entity could not be classified as a partnership. Had this regulation been approved, it would
have made the existence of the single corporate characteristic of limited liability dispositive of
whether a domestic or a foreign organization is classified as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes.
In MC,4, this regulation would have given the government the result it wanted, as limited liability
was the one corporate characteristic MCA conceded with respect to each of the distributorships.
The notice of proposed rulemaking accompanying this proposal was careful to point out,
however, that the regulation was not intended to affect the application of the classification rules to
any entities other than those that enjoy complete limited liability under the applicable local law.
The regulation also would provide that entities organized under statutes corresponding to the
Uniform Partnership or the Uniform Limited Partnership acts would continue to be classified
under the existing rules because those statutes make general partners personally liable for partner-
ship debts. Therefore, it would appear that except for equipment-leasing trusts and the few other
types of entities that enjoy both limited liability and partnership tax status, without being subject
to the UPA or the ULPA, the proposed regulation was aimed at the classification of foreign enti-
ties. In any case, the proposal was withdrawn on December 16, 1982. The Service said that "[i]n
response to public commentary on the proposal, the IRS will reevaluate its means of classifica-
tion." [1982] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6288.
61 685 F.2d at 1102.
62 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
63 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1960).
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under both the organizational documents and the applicable local laws,
continuity of life did not exist with respect to the distributorships. 64
Relying on Revenue Ruling 77-214,65 however, the government argued
that the partners who controlled the outlets-CIC and Stichting-were
not competing owners with separate interests, but were different com-
ponents of a single interest represented by the MCA/Paramount joint
venture.66 This lack of a separate interest, it was claimed, gave rise to
the presence of continuity of life on the theory that upon the happening
of one of the specified events, there would be no separate interest to
compel dissolution of the partnerships. What the government and the
district court seemingly ignored was that the distributorships would be
dissolved under local law upon the happening of any of the specified
events, including the bankruptcy of either of its owners. Thus, the
bankruptcy of either Stichting or CIC would automatically cause the
dissolution of the distributorships whether or not the owners repre-
sented separate interests and despite their best efforts to continue them.
Furthermore, the regulations specifically point out that while an agree-
ment by which an organization is established may provide that the
business will be continued by the remaining members in the event of
the death or withdrawal of any member, such agreement does not es-
tablish continuity of life if, under local law, such an event would other-
wise cause a dissolution of the organization.6 7
Free transferability of interests exists if each member of the organ-
ization, or those members owning substantially all of the interests, may
transfer their interests in the organization without the consent of the
other members.68 With respect to the distributorships in MCA, free
transferability apparently did not exist because of applicable local law
and because of the provision in the organizational documents provid-
64 685 F.2d at 1102.
65 See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
66 Government Brief, supra note 58, at 26.
67 See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975). In Zuckman, the Court of
Claims rejected the government's argument that one individual's control, both direct and indirect,
of more than a 98% interest in the partnership gave it continuity of life, reasoning that the corpo-
rate general partner could still become bankrupt and, in such event, the partnership would auto-
matically dissolve.
68 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960). If under local law, a transfer of the member's inter-
ests would result in the dissolution of the old organization and the formation of a new one, free
transferability of interests does not exist. Id. If each member may transfer his or her interest to
another only after offering it to the other members at fair market value, a modified form of free
transferability exists. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960). Although the regulations provide
that this modified form will be accorded less significance in characterizing an entity as a corpora-
tion, "there appears to be no practical difference.. .and either full free transferability or modified
free transferability will count as a corporate characteristic." Tax Report, supra note 1, at 191.
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ing that no member may transfer, pledge or in any way burden its in-
terest in the outlet without the approval of the other member.69 Here
again the government argued that because there were no separate inter-
ests, the requirement that consent be obtained was an empty formality
and, in reality, free transferability was present.70
From the time of their promulgation,7" the section 7701 regula-
tions have been severely criticized on the grounds that they are incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Morrissey,72 and that their
incorporation of a "preponderance test' 73 paved the way for "tax shel-
ters" to obtain the coveted partnership status needed to make them so
attractive to high-bracket investors. The Service recognized the latter
effect, particularly with respect to limited partnerships, and on January
5, 1977, issued proposed regulations74 that implicitly rejected the pre-
ponderance test. The Service stated that "[b]ecause the overall resem-
blance of an organization to a corporation is determinative for
purposes of classification, an organization may be classified as an asso-
ciation when it resembles a corporation with respect to two or more of
the four characteristics. . .. ,7" Furthermore, the regulations redefined
the characteristics and provided that where only two of the characteris-
tics were met, each of the characteristics would be reexamined to evalu-
ate its relative importance to the determination of the organization's
overall resemblance to a corporation.76 Mysteriously, these proposed
regulations were withdrawn the same day they were issued. Whether
this was in response to pressure from other branches of government77
69 685 F.2d at 1102.
70 Government Brief, supra note 58, at 24. As MCA points out in its brief, however, even if
CIC and the employee trust were not separate interests, neither one could vest a transferee with
free transferability of interests, which the government claimed was one attribute of CIC's and the
employee trust's interests in the distributorships, because the restriction in the organizational doc-
uments against the transfer of an interest by one owner of a distributorship without the consent of
the other owner would clearly be enforceable by or against any transferee. Thus, the right to
transfer an interest would at most apply to the initial transfer by either owner, and the power to
transfer would be incomplete since the transferee could not be vested with the right to freely trans-
fer his interests. See MCA Brief, supra note 15, at 17. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960) pro-
vides: "In order for this power of substitution to exist in the corporate sense, the member must be
able, without the consent of other members, to confer upon his substitute all the attributes of his
interest in the organization."
71 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
72 296 U.S. 344 (1935). See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 191 (1976) (Raum, J., dis-
senting); Fisher, supra note 52, at 660.
73 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
74 See Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-I to -3, 42 Fed. Reg. 1038-44 (1977).
75 42 Fed. Reg. at 1040 (emphasis added).
76 Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (example 4), 42 Fed. Reg. at 1042.
77 See A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL, & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 184.03 (1981)
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or represented the Service's tacit approval of the mechanical classifica-
tion provided by the existing regulations is debatable. The Treasury
Department has not yet made a public announcement about when, if
ever, it intends to re-issue the proposed regulations.78 In any event,
until the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-214, most observers assumed
that only the criteria set forth in the section 7701 regulations would be
used in classifying foreign entities for United States tax purposes.
B. Revenue Ruling 77-214
Revenue Ruling 77-214 was unique not only because the Service
premised its holding on a test found neither in the Code nor in the
regulations, but more fundamentally because it was the first time the
legal ownership of an entity, rather than simply its legal structure, was
examined in determining classification for tax purposes. The situation
involved a German GmbH79 formed by two wholly owned domestic
subsidiaries of a United States corporation. The company was set up to
provide marketing and support services for the parent company's oper-
ations in foreign countries. Given the great number of optional provi-
sions that can be used to modify the character of a GmbH so that it can
assume the characteristics of a partnership or a corporation, the Service
looked to German law to determine the legal relationships of the par-
ties involved. Although the German organization's memorandum of
association provided that it would be dissolved by the death, insanity
or bankruptcy of a shareholder and that the shares were not freely
transferable, the Service declared it an association taxable as a
corporation. 0
The Service found that under German law a GmbH possesses as-
sociates and an objective to divide profits, characteristics common to
both corporations and partnerships, along with the corporate character-
istics of limited liability and centralization of management.8 ' Thus,
classification as a corporation would depend on finding either of the
two remaining corporate characteristics, continuity of life and free
(the authors claim that the principal objection to the regulations was that they would severely
limit the formation of tax shelters and thus inhibit the nation's economic recovery).
78 Id. at § 184.10.
79 Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haflung (GmbH) literally means an association with limited
liability. Formed pursuant to a memorandum of association, it is a juridical person under Ger-
man law that has the corporate characteristics of limited liability and centralization of manage-
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transferability of interests.82  The Service ruled that because the parent
corporation could control its domestic subsidiaries, which owned 100%
of the GmbH, there were no separate interests to compel dissolution of
the organization or to ensure that the interests were not freely transfer-
able. Therefore, both of these characteristics were present and the
GmbH was taxable as a corporation.83 The district court in MCA
adopted the identical rationale in finding the film distributorships to be
taxable as corporations.84
C. Reaction to the Ruling
Commentators immediately criticized Revenue Ruling 77-214.
Opponents claimed that if two wholly owned subsidiaries of a United
States parent constitute a single economic interest for the purpose of
determining the presence or absence of the four characteristics that dis-
tinguish a partnership from a corporation, then this test also would
have to be applied to the characteristics common to both partnerships
and corporations: associates and a joint profit motive.8" If this were
the case, then under the regulations, the MCA distributorships would
be neither partnerships nor corporations for tax purposes,86 but rather
branches of CIC, which of course would be treated quite differently. 8
7
Indeed, branches rather than separate entities would be found in every
case where the test is applied.88 While the Service has not yet gone this
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See supra notes 25 to 39 and accompanying text.
85 Tax Report, supra note 1, at 201.
86 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960) states:
Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit are essential characteris-
tics of all organizations engaged in business for profit.... the absence of either of these
essential characteristics will cause an arrangement among co-owners of property for the de-
velopment of such property for the separate profit of each not to be classified as an
association.
87 Had the Service adopted this posture, see infra note 108, MCA would still have been enti-
tled to judgment. This is because if the film distributorships were neither corporations nor part-
nerships, but were instead branches of CIC, there would still have been no Subpart F income and
no current U.S. tax liability. MCA Brief, supra note 15, at 6. Because the distributorships would
not be separate entities apart from CIC for U.S. tax purposes, CIC's income would be deemed to
derive directly from the rental of films to unrelated parties and thus would not be Subpart F
income. Id. at 6 n.9. See I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A) (1976) (foreign personal holding company income
does not include rents and royalties derived in the active conduct of a trade or business and that
are received from other than a related person).
Moreover, as explained earlier, the reasons why MCA set up separate entities in the first place
were essentially non-tax related. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.. Thus, the abuses
meant to be forestalled by the Subpart F provisions did not exist here.
88 Shortly before Revenue Ruling 77-214 was issued, the Service issued five private letter rul-
ings to taxpayers in which it held essentially that where all the interests of a foreign commercial
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far, its application of the single economic interest test to some, but not
all, of the characteristics is clearly inconsistent. Recently issued rulings
demonstrate that the Service itself is unsure about the correct applica-
tion of the test. 9
Furthermore, as pointed out by one commentator, 90 it would be
possible to apply the single economic interest theory when determining
whether centralization of management exists, employing the argument
that where a single economic interest holds all the ownership and con-
trol, there is only one management voice. The finding of centralization
of management, in addition to a finding of continuity of life and free
transferability of interests, would result in the consistent classification
of foreign entities owned by a single economic interest as corporations
under the tests prescribed by section 301.7701 of the regulations. Thus,
it would be impossible for a corporate group to operate a foreign part-
nership so long as its full ownership is held, directly or indirectly by a
single corporate parent at any point in its structure. While the separate
interests test has been extended this far only once, 91 the uncertainty
surrounding its application has caused taxpayers examining the tax
ramifications of a particular foreign form of organization to fear that
carefully structured business plans may be frustrated and the tax results
reversed by new interpretations of the law.
venture are held by a single beneficial interest, the venture is to be characterized as a branch for
U.S. tax purposes. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 7743060 (July 28, 1977), 7743077 (July 29, 1977), 7747083
(Aug. 26, 1977), 7748038 (Aug. 31, 1977), and 7802012 (Oct. 11, 1977). These rulings were imme-
diately withdrawn prospectively by five subsequent private rulings. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 7806062,
7806056, 7806055, 7806057, and 7806058 (all Nov. 11, 1977). The Service offered no explanation
other than the vague statement that the withdrawn rulings were "not in accord with views of the
Service concerning the proper tax classification of foreign organizations that have only one benefi-
cial owner." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7806058 (Nov. 11, 1977).
89 Compare Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7934096 (May 24, 1979) (French socit en nom collectif (SNC),
owned entirely by first and second tier wholly-owned subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation, found to
be a partnership for tax purposes, ignoring the lack of separate interests) with Priv. Ltr. Rul.
7936050 (June 8, 1979) (Chilean sociedad an6nima, owned by a U.S. corporation and its domestic
subsidiary found to be a corporation for tax purposes, where Service claimed that because the U.S.
parent "could be expected to exercise great influence" over the subsidiary holding the rest of the
equity in the limftada, under the authority of Revenue Ruling 77-214, the corporate characteristic
of free transferability was present).
90 Tax Report, supra note 1, at 206.
91 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8034094 (May 29, 1980) (Service applied the single economic interest
theory to the corporate characteristic of centralized management, reasoning that where a GmbH
was owned entirely by a first and second tier subsidiary of a U.S. parent, the parent, which in
effect owned all the interests in the GmbH, had the continuing authority to make the business
decisions for it).
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IV. NECESSITY OF DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS
What is perhaps even more disturbing to planners than the appli-
cation of the test itself is the fact that it is used exclusively with respect
to foreign entities. The classification problem in MCA arose in the
context of the Subpart F provisions, Code sections 951 through 972,
and thus an understanding of these provisions and of the importance of
entity classification is necessary to determine whether a different,
stricter set of standards should be implemented to prevent abuse.
A. The Purpose Behind Subpart F
A foreign corporation, even one controlled by American share-
holders, was not subject to United States tax on its foreign source in-
come until 1962. Consequently, no United States tax was imposed at
all until the income was repatriated by the foreign corporation to its
United States shareholders92 in the form of dividends. 93 This system
reflected the nation's policy of promoting the free flow of capital and
goods in international commerce, and encouraging United States in-
vestment abroad.94 It was felt that to tax earnings of foreign subsidiar-
ies would place the United States firm in a disadvantageous position in
comparison with foreign-owned competitors, especially those operating
out of other industrialized nations which did not impose a similar bur-
den on their citizens.95
This policy of allowing a deferral of United States tax on the for-
eign earnings of a United States CFC until the earnings were distrib-
uted to the United States shareholders was seriously challenged in
1962, when the suggestion was made that the United States tax laws
should be neutral in their application to domestic and foreign invest-
92 Even then it was the shareholder and not the corporation who was taxed, as the United
States has the power to tax U.S. persons on all income, regardless of source. This reflected the
Untied States' global, as opposed to the territorial, approach to taxation, under which the world-
wide income of a U.S. person is fully subject to U.S. tax, unless a specific statutory exemption
applies. See Hammer, Tax Considerations of the InternationalBusiness Venture, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& CoM. REG. 259 (1981).
93 This phenomenon of tax deferral occurred only if the foreign subsidiary did not pay out
its earnings to its U.S. shareholders as dividend distributions. Thus, it was not unheard of for
a foreign subsidiary to lend money to its U.S. parent corporation; the incidence of a loan did
not subject such monies to U.S. taxation. Consequently, the parent corporation had the tax-
free use of the income of the foreign subsidiary.
G. RANzAL, TAX DEFERRAL FOR FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: MINIdIZING SUBPART F. INCOME 4
(1973).
94 Jenks, Taxation of Foreign Income, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 537 (1974).
95 See id. at 542. See also P. McDANEL & H. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 128 (1981); O'Connor, United States Taxation of Earnings of Ameri-
can-Controlled Foreign Corporations, 42 TAXES 588, 603 (1964).
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ment.96 In a message to Congress in 1961, President John F. Kennedy
indicated the undesirability of continuing this tax deferral, proposing
its elimination entirely.97  His greatest indictment, however, was
against the use of the tax deferral in tax haven countries, where an
attempt was made to sharply reduce or eliminate tax liabilities both at
home and abroad through the employment of artificial arrangements.9"
Congress did not eliminate tax deferral on foreign earnings en-
tirely.99 Rather, it enacted legislation to deal with the taxation of cer-
tain types of income earned by foreign corporations owned by United
States controlling interests. In creating Subpart F, Congress' aim was
to eliminate deferral of United States tax where the company is a non-
operating foreign subsidiary, which passively receives investment in-
come, set up in a country that imposes little or no tax.100 Because the
United States had no jurisdiction to tax such foreign corporations di-
rectly, 0 1 Subpart F was directed at the United States shareholders of
96 See Jenks, supra note 94, at 537; O'Connor, supra note 95, at 602-03. Treasury Secretary
Dillon, in a statement before the House Ways and Means Committee, argued that such a deferral
permitted an advantage for a U.S. firm operating abroad as compared with one operating within
the U.S., and that if tax neutrality was to exist, it should be through the elimination of the tax
factor in the U.S. investor's choice between domestic and foreign investment. HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. Doc. No. 140, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1961) (statement by Douglas
Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury).
97 President Kennedy felt that rather than fostering competition, the deferral privilege actually
discriminated against investment within the U.S. and intensified internal unemployment, balance
of trade, and balance of payment problems. See Comment, Foreign Personal Holding Company
Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 155, 158 n.13 (1979).
98 These arrangements took many forms, but the shelter Subpart F was designed to deal with
most directly was the sale of goods manufactured in the U.S. to a subsidiary incorporated in one
foreign country, the "base country", with the subsidiary in turn selling the goods to an affiliated
corporation, the sub-subsidiary, organized in the country where the goods were to be resold to the
ultimate consumer or to unrelated wholesalers. By fixing the prices so that the spread was largest
between the cost of goods sold and the price paid by the unrelated buyers, this profit could be
segregated in the "base company". If the base company was organized in a country that imposed
no income tax or treated the base company's profit as exempt foreign-source income, the taxes
paid by the parent to the U.S. and by the sub-subisidary to the country of destination would be
minimized. B. BrrrcER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 17.32 (4th ed. 1979). For an excellent example of the type of tax haven at which
Subpart F was aimed, see R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED
TRANSACTIONS § 3.01(2) (1982).
99 Note that Subpart F did not eliminate deferral in all situations where a foreign corporation
is owned by American interests, and was not intended to include income of CFC's generated in
the country in which the corporation is located. P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 95, at 128.
In 1978, the Carter Administration proposed amending the tax law "to provide current taxation of
all income earned by CFCs, not just the specified tax haven income, but that proposal was never
approved by Congress." Hammer, supra note 92, at 260 n.3.
100 H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 405, 462
101 See I.R.C. §§ 881, 882 (1976). A foreign corporation is subject to federal income tax on
only two categories of gross income: (i) gross income that is derived from sources within the U.S.
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such corporations °2 and provided that such income was to be taxable
to the shareholders in the year the income was earned by the foreign
corporation, whether or not those earnings were actually distributed.
An understanding of the rules under Subpart F requires answering
three basic questions: (a) What type of United States shareholder is
subject to taxation under Subpart F? (b) What constitutes a controlled
foreign corporation? and (c) What categories of the foreign corpora-
tion's income are subject to tax even though not distributed to the
shareholders? 13
For the purposes of Subpart F, a United States shareholder is any
United States person who owns or is considered as owning, under the
attribution rules of section 958, ten percent or more of the total com-
bined voting stock of such foreign corporation. 1" The shareholder
must own the stock on the last day of the taxable year in which the
corporation is a CFC.0 5 Thus, if there are eleven unrelated United
States shareholders, each owning 9 /%, but together owning 100% of
the voting stock of a foreign corporation, CFC status may be
avoided."°6 In MCA, the stockholders of CIC were MCA (forty-nine
percent), Paramount (forty-nine percent) and Stichting (two percent).
So under section 951, MCA and Paramount were United States share-
holders subject to tax on their share of CIC's Subpart F income in the
year in which it was earned.
A controlled foreign corporation is one in which United States
shareholders own, directly or indirectly, more than fifty percent of the
voting stock on any day of the taxable year. 10 7 The legislative focus
here is on closely-held corporations controlled by a small group of
United States taxpayers, located in a foreign jurisdiction offering com-
plete exemption from tax, lower corporate tax rates, or other favorable
but is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the U.S. and
(ii) gross income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the U.
S.
102 See I.R.C. § 95 1(a) (1976). The Subpart F provisions were held constitutional in Whitlock
v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839 (1974), mandamus
granted, 547 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1977); Garlock, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); Dougherty v. Commissioner,
60 T.C. 917 (1973).
103 Tillinghast, United States Income Taxation of Foreign Source Income-4 Survey of the Provi-
sions and Problems, 29 INsT. ON FED. TAX'N 1, 24 (1971).
104 I.R.C. § 951(b) (1976).
105 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
106 See P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 95, at 120.
107 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1976). Income will not be includible in the gross income of the U.S. share-
holder, however, unless the corporation constitutes a CFC for an uninterrupted period of thirty
days or more during the taxable year. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1).
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tax status.108 Here again, because MCA and Paramount are both
United States shareholders and together own ninety-eight percent of
the voting stock of CIC, it qualifies as a controlled foreign
corporation.10 9
There are four categories of undistributed income taxed to United
States shareholders of controlled foreign corporations: (1) Subpart F
income,110 (2) previously excluded Subpart F income withdrawn from
investment in less developed countries, 1 ' (3) previously excluded Sub-
part F income withdrawn from foreign base shipping operations, 112
and (4) increases in earnings invested in United States property. 113
Subpart F income includes income derived from the insurance of
United States risks, foreign base company income, income attributable
to international boycotts, and amounts attributable to illegal bribes and
kickbacks. 1 4  Foreign base company 15 income, the type with which
the court in MCA was concerned, is covered by section 954 and consists
of foreign personal holding company income, foreign base company
sales income, foreign base company services income, foreign base com-
pany shipping income and foreign base company oil-related income. 116
According to one commentator, the decision by Congress to tax
the earnings of foreign personal holding companies arises from the var-
ious forms of abuse that operation as a corporation offers wealthy tax-
payers. 1 7 The tax benefits accorded the corporate entity are given on
the fundamental assumption that corporations are to be the means of
108 Note, Comparative Analysis of Systems of Domestic Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tions, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99, 100 n.2 (1981); see P. POSTLEWAIT., INTERNATIONAL COR-
PoRATE TAXATION § 12.05 (1980).
109 Note that the regulations provide that "[a]ny arrangement to shift formal voting power
away from United States shareholders of a foreign corporation will not be given effect if in reality
voting power is retained." Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(2) (1963). Thus, in determining whether a
foreign corporation is a CFC, the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of such voting
power may be as applicable as the legal ownership. Artificial arrangements have been found
where the principal purpose was to shift sufficiently legal ownership to avoid controlled foreign
corporation status. G. RANZAL, supra note 93, at 33.
110 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
III I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A)(ii).
112 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(A)(iii).
113 I.R.C. § 951(a)(1)(B).
114 I.R.C. § 952(a) (West Supp. 1983).
115 A base company is a corporation or other limited liability company organized in a country
that imposes little or no tax on domestic corporation income derived from sources outside the
country. Usually involving the purchase and resale of personal property or the rendition of signif-
icant services, these corporations are set up solely for the purpose of conducting third-country
operations. R. RHoADEs & M. LANGER, supra note 98, at § 3.03(3)(b)(i).
116 I.R.C. § 954 (West Supp. 1983).
117 See Comment, supra note 97, at 156 n.6.
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conducting an active enterprise."1 ' When use of the corporate entity
serves no legitimate business purpose and only provides taxpayers with
a means for sheltering income, the justification for these benefits is
lost. 119
The income earned by the MCA distributorships constituted for-
eign personal holding company income (FPHCI) under section
954(c)(1), which includes rents and royalties received from related per-
sons.120 The Code provides that if the rents or royalties are derived in
the active conduct of a trade or business, they do not constitute
FPHCI. 21 This provision, however, does not apply if the income is
received from a "related person." 122 The Code also provides that
FPHCI does not include some rents or royalties received from related
persons, but only if the amounts received are for the privilege of using
the property within the country in which the CFC is incorporated."
Because the MCA distributorships' income was earned outside the
Netherlands, the country in which CIC was incorporated, whether the
income constitutes FPHCI depends on whether the distributorships
were related persons with respect to CIC. The applicable Code provi-
sion, section 954(d)(3), defines a related person as (1) an individual,
partnership, trust or estate which controls the CFC; (2) a corporation
which controls, or is controlled by, the CFC; or (3) a corporation which
118 The definition of 'foreign base company income' in Subpart F does not include income
derived from the manufacture, production, or sale of property in the foreign corporation's
country of incorporation. The rationale.. .was that these were legitimate business opera-
tions conducted in or from a foreign location. Subpart F was designed to reach only those
cases where the international tax system was abused by flowing income into low tax jurisdic-
tions which have no real connection with the business activity generating the income.
Jenks, suapra note 94, at 544.
119 Comment, supra note 97, at 156 n.6.
120 I.R.C. § 954(c)(4)(C) (1976). Foreign personal holding company income, for the purposes
of section 954, is patterned on the definition of foreign personal holding company income found in
section 553, with certain modifications to broaden its scope. I.R.C. § 954(c)(1).
121 I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A). Note, however, that the regulations attempt to limit the use of this
exemption by greatly restricting activities that constitute a trade or business. In the case of royal-
ties, for example, the licensor must manufacture or produce the property or substantially add to its
value prior to the leasing of such property. Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(d)(1)(iii) (1964).
122 See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
123 I.R.C. § 954(c)(4)(C) (1976). If the property is used both within and without the country in
which the CFC is incorporated, the portion of the income attributable to the use of the property
outside the country of incorporation is foreign personal holding company income. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.954-2(c)(3) (1964). The policy underlying this exception is a Congressional determination that
United States shareholders should not be penalized for conducting activities through a number of
entities as opposed to only one. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 83 (1962), reprinted in
1962-3 C.B. 707, 789. Thus, the objective is to exclude such income from FPHCI where such
amounts would reflect earnings of an active business if such activity had been conducied within
the CFC's corporate shell.
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is controlled by the same person or persons which control the CFC. 24
The government argued in MCAI that this Code section should be
interpreted broadly to eliminate what it termed "an abusive form of tax
shelter." 125 It claimed that "Congress enacted Subpart F to eliminate
the tax deferral advantage of doing business through [CFCs], by taxing
currently to United States shareholders all income that is deemed
earned by those shareholders," and that "Congress was more con-
cerned with the nature of the income than the form of the entity gener-
ating the income."' 26 The government further argued that the "use [in
section 954(d)(3)] of the word 'corporation' in defining 'related person'
was a matter of drafting convenience without particular signifi-
cance,"12 7 concluding that the abuse Congress sought to rectify occurs
with other kinds of entities, including controlled partnerships.2 8
Although there is no legislative history discussing Congress' defini-
tion of related persons under section 954(d)(3), one can scarcely con-
clude that the omission of the word "partnership" in subsection (B) was
unintentional, because subsection (A) of the same section specifically
includes a controlling partnership of a controlled foreign corporation in
its definition of a related person. 129 Furthermore, given the fact that
the Subpart F provisions were enacted in 1962, Congress' failure after
twenty years to amend its provisions so as to include income earned by
a controlled partnership certainly weakens the argument that its omis-
sion was the result of congressional oversight.
The purpose of the Subpart F provisions is to limit the deferral
advantage only to those United States corporations that need the ad-
vantage in order to compete more effectively with businesses controlled
by foreign interests which do not have to pay taxes on income earned
by subsidiaries outside the foreign countries' boundaries. 3 ' The defer-
ral advantage is not intended to include situations where no competi-
tive purpose is to be achieved, such as where the CFC buys from its
parent in one country and sells to a related corporation in another
124 See I.R.C. § 954(d)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-1(c)(1) (1964). Con-
trol means direct or indirect ownership, applying the stock ownership attribution rules prescribed
in section 958, of over 50% of the corporation's voting stock. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(3) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983).
125 685 F.2d at 1104.
126 Id. at 1104-05.
127 Government Brief, supra note 58, at 17.
128 See id. While the government did not claim that the foreign film distribution arrangement
was motivated wholly by tax-related considerations, it still characterized it as "exactly the kind of
abusive shelter which the legislation was designed to foreclose." Id. at 9.
129 I.R.C. § 954(d)(3)(A) (1976).
130 P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 95, at 127-28.
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country, or where the CFC is acting merely as a holding company.' 31
It is not altogether clear whether deferral should not be allowed in the
situation where a controlled foreign corporation is dealing with a re-
latedpartnershiO. The fundamental differences between operating as a
corporation and operating as a partnership are significant enough that
further congressional action is necessary before it can authoritatively
be said that Subpart F was intended to tax such income. As the Ninth
Circuit pointed out in MCA!, if a loophole exists in the Subpart F provi-
sions, a prospective change in the regulations under that section is pref-
erable to a judicial distinction based on whether the entities involved
are foreign or domestic. 132
B. Foreign Entity Classification
The government's main argument inMCA was that even if income
was to be included as Subpart F income only if the distributorships
were related corporations, the distributorships should be classified for
tax purposes as corporations despite the fact they were organized as
partnerships. For the purpose of United States taxation, the starting
point for the classification of organizations is the standard prescribed
by section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code.'33 According to Reve-
nue Ruling 73-254,134 these tests and standards are to be used also in
the classification of foreign organizations.'35 If the organization
formed under foreign law is of the kind that can be classified for
United States tax purposes either as a corporation or as a partner-
ship, 136 classification will depend upon how the rights and obligations
131 Id. at 128.
132 685 F.2d at 1105.
133 See LR.C. § 7701 (West Supp. 1983); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409,
T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553, T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482, T.D. 7889, 1983-22 I.R.B. 16; see also
supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
134 1973-1 C.B. 613. This Revenue Ruling provided.
Held, the tests and standards which will be applied in classifying the unincorporated business
organization as a partnership, as a trust, as an association taxable as a corporation, or as some
other taxable entity will be determined under Section 7701 of the Code and the regulations
thereunder. However, it is the local law of the foreign jurisdiction that must be applied in
determining the legal relationships of the members of the organization among themselves and
with the public at large, as well as the interests of the members of the organization in its
assets.
135 See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories International Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321, 325
(N.D. Ill. 1958), q,9'd per curlam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959).
136 Examples of such organizations include a German GmbH (Gesel/schaft mit beschriankter
Haftung), a Columbian SRL (sociedad de res ponsibilidad), and a French SNC (sodibas en nom
collectl/), where local law provides enough flexibility that classification for U.S. tax purposes will
depend upon how the parties' rights and obligations are defined in the entity's governing
documents.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:680(1983)
of the parties are fixed in the organization's governing documents.
There is no authority, however, flatly stating that an entity "incorpo-
rated" in a foreign jurisdiction will be treated as a corporation for
United States tax purposes, 137 and recent private letter rulings issued
by the Service seem to require careful structuring of the organizational
forms of foreign entities if the risk of reclassification is to be
minimized. 38
Certainly, classification of an entity under foreign law is not dis-
positive and is often irrelevant to the entity's status for United States
tax purposes.139 Moreover, the fact that the foreign jurisdiction's laws
impose different tax treatment on the foreign organization than that
imposed under United States tax laws should not affect the manner in
which the tests under the regulations are applied.14 0 The fact that the
tax results in the foreign jurisdiction are different than in the United
States is not a sufficient justification for subjecting foreign entities to a
stricter standard. 141
While the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
MCA, it still recognized that a separate interests test could be applied
in determining the proper classification of a foreign entity for United
States tax purposes. The Ninth Circuit seemed to ignore a prior ruling
in which the Service refused to apply the separate interests test when
classifying domestic entities. In that ruling, 142 four domestic corpora-
137 Tax Report, supra note 1, at 210.
138 See Tax Report, supra note 1, at 222-38 (Appendix B). In response to the confusion and
uncertainty, in 1976 the Service issued Guidelines on Foreign Forms ofBusiness Organizations as
part of its Internal Revenue Manual. The Guidelines listed nearly 200 forms of business organiza-
tions used in 45 countries, tentatively classifying them as corporations or partnerships. It was
careful to point out, however, that the classifications were not to be "construed as the position of
the Service" and that each case was subject to the factors outlined in the regulations. id. at 196.
139 Majers, supra note 36, at 264; see Arundel Corp. v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct.
Cf. 1952) (Puerto Rico treated a joint venture formed by three U.S. corporations as a separate
taxable entity while under the principles of U.S. tax law, it was held to be a partnership). But see
Raffety Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 834
(1975), where the court recognized the potential for the abuse of the split tax personality of enti-
ties. Referring to the limitation on the owner's personal liability under Mexican law, the court
stated that a "[tlaxpayer may not escape liability in a foreign nation's courts under one theory and
then seek an advantage in this nation's courts by contending its opposite."
140 See Tax Report, supra note 1, at 211.
141 Md. at 212. The government argued inMCA that the use of the separate interests test goes to
the substantive presence of the corporate characteristics, or in other words, that no additional
factors are being engrafted on the regulations but rather the regulations are simply being read in a
common-sense way that give effect to their substance. Government Brief, supra note 58, at 20-21.
The government failed to explain, however, why this "common-sense" approach was not taken in
its classification of a domestic entity in Revenue Ruling 75-19,see infra notes 142-45 and accom-
panying text.
142 Rev. Rul. 75-19, 1975-1 C.B. 382.
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tions, all subsidiaries of the same domestic parent, entered into a part-
nership agreement for the purpose of purchasing a crude oil storage
barge and chartering it to an unrelated corporation. The arrangement
among the subsidiary corporations was formed under a statute corre-
sponding to the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA). 143 It was stipulated
that the subsidiary corporations each had business reasons for existence
independent of the business to be performed under the partnership
agreement, and that the agreement was not entered into for the purpose
of avoiding or evading federal income tax. The Service held that be-
cause the arrangement was subject to a statute corresponding to the
UPA, it automatically lacked the corporate characteristics of continuity
of life, centralization of management, and limited liability. Therefore,
the arrangement did not have more corporate than noncorporate char-
acteristics and was classified as a partnership for federal tax pur-
poses."4 What is clear from this ruling is that a taxpayer may choose
the form of domestic organization to fit both business needs and tax
objectives as long as the taxpayer is willing to take on all the burdens as
well as the benefits connected with the choice. Why the same free
choice does not prevail for foreign entities is not exactly clear.'45
One commentator suggests that one possible ground for distinction
with respect to foreign entities may be found in the regulations under
section 7701.14 There, constant reference is made to general partner-
ships that are subject to a statute corresponding to the UPA, and lim-
ited partnerships that are subject to a statute corresponding to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), as lacking certain corporate
characteristics. 47 In a foreign jurisdiction, such statutes obviously do
not exist, thereby affording a basis for distinction. 148 Because these for-
143 Id. at 382-83.
144 Id.
145 See Tax Report, supra note 1, at 208-09, which states:
The Service has not yet articulated reasons why the tests for the classification of a foreign
entity held by two or more commonly controlled owners should not be the same tests that
appear in Revenue Ruling 75-19. Further, Revenue Ruling 73-254 endorses the use of the
same standards for classifying both foreign and domestic entities.
If there are policy justifications for the use of a different standard, the policies should be
stated and dealt with in a specific and limited fashion.
146 See P. POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, supra note 54, at § 10.03 n. 21.
147 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1960) (continuity of life); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(c)(4), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 416, T.D. 7889, 1983-22 I.R.B. 16, 17 (centralization of man-
agement); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960) (limited liability).
148 See P. POSTLEWArrE & M. COLLINS, supra note 54, at § 10.03. But see Zuckman v. United
States, 524 F.2d 729, 734-35 (Ct. CL 1975) (finding of no continuity of life did not depend solely
upon the regulation's explicit reference to the ULPA, but also upon the regulation's general state-
ment that continuity of life does not exist if the occurrence of any of certain events causes dissolu-
tion of the partnership under local law).
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eign laws create entities that do not track our domestic forms, the argu-
ment is made that the entities fail to guarantee they are economically
and practically functioning as labelled under foreign law.149 This argu-
ment completely ignores, however, the rule that in applying the four
characteristics classification test, relationships are examined as they ex-
ist under local law,15 which may be foreign law. The references to the
UPA and ULPA merely provide a guarantee that entities organized
under those acts will meet certain requirements, regardless of state law
on the subject.
Furthermore, as the New York State Bar Association Report
points out,151 in other areas where there were specific potential abuses
to be forestalled in the choice of the foreign entity to be used, Congress
has legislated various Code sections to deal with them. 52 In addition,
other nonstatutory doctrines, such as the assignment of income doc-
trine, the step transaction, and the sham and corporation conduit ap-
proaches, exist to prevent income from being unjustifiably sheltered.
As the New York Bar Association noted: "These reduce the possibility
of taxpayer abuse in selecting an appropriate foreign entity to the point
where there seems to be no further justification for frustrating the tax-
payer's selection of the tax character of his foreign organization." '53
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's recognition of a different standard for classifi-
cation of foreign entities, a standard found in neither the Code nor the
regulations, is unreasonable given the Service's earlier ruling that the
same tests are to be used for classifying both foreign and domestic enti-
ties. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Subpart F provisions to indi-
cate that Congress was concerned about entities that technically meet
149 Government Brief, supra note 58, at 28 n.13.
150 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (1960) (continuity of life); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
2(d)(1) (1960) (limited liability); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960) (free transferability of
interests).
151 Tax Report, supra note 1, at 209.
152 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 269 (1976) (acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax); I.R.C. § 367
(West Supp. 1983) (transfers to controlled foreign corporations), I.R.C. §§ 551-558 (1976 & West
Supp. 1983) (foreign personal holding companies); I.R.C. § 679 (Supp. V 1981) (taxing grantors on
income from certain foreign trusts); I.R.C. § 1248 (West Supp. 1983) (sale or exchange of stock in
controlled foreign corporations).
153 Tax Report, supra note 1, at 211. Ironically, the § 7701 regulations were supposedly drafted
with the aim of making it difficult to qualify as a corporation in order to limit the availability of
corporate fringe benefits not otherwise available to venturers doing business in the partnership
form.
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the partnership requirements but have, according to the government,
all the attributes of a corporation.
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in its application, and the
Ninth Circuit's ruling that it was not applicable to the facts of the MCA
case, the "separate interests test" appears to be here to stay. For plan-
ners, the most straightforward way to avoid the separate interests test is
to have an unrelated third party own a small but significant percentage
of the distribution entity.154 This third-party ownership presumably
would indicate that neither of the corporate characteristics of con-
tinuity of life or free transferability of interests would be present. In
addition, express provisions that outline the effects of the various
events and circumstances should be included in the organizational doc-
uments and should be designed so as to avoid the finding of corporate
characteristics. Despite the fact that the courts and the Service have
tended to ignore the entity's organizational documents, by explaining
the impact and consequences of the operation of local law, provisions
negating the presence of continuity of life or free transferability of in-
terests may be given effect.
Solutions such as these are only temporary. The tax ramifications
of choosing to operate as one type of entity over another are significant
enough that taxpayers must be able to rely on something more predict-
able in planning their foreign business ventures. The criteria for an
entity's tax classification should be the same for both foreign and do-
mestic entities, and if there is a potential for abuse in a particular area,
it can be handled better through the legislative or regulatory processes.
Daniel N. Zucker
154 Hamilton, supra note 38, at 307-08.
